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Abstract
This document examines foreign direct investment (FDI) when multi-
nationals and labour unions bargain over labour contracts and lobby
the self-interested government for taxation and labour market regu-
lation. It is shown that FDI is best protected from expropriation in
unionized economies with right-to-manage bargaining, not bargain-
ing over wages and employment. When the labour market is non-
unionized or when there is bargaining over wages and employment,
the ruling elite can use taxation or labour market regulation as a non-
distorting vehicle to expropriate the surplus of FDI.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the profitability of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
economies with labour unions and self-interested local elites. Because FDI
involves sunk costs, the investment risk of a multinational company (MNC)
is comprised of changes in wages, taxes, regulations and market conditions
that implicitly expropriate the MNC’s rents after FDI has taken place. To
explain the strategic dependence between unions, authorities and prospective
investors, we use a common agency model,1 and establish a political equi-
librium in which the government determines taxes and regulates the labour
market. In this environment, lobbies representing unions and MNCs make
offers that relate prospective contributions to government policy.
The government can regulate union power in two ways. First, it can re-
strict the number of workers which can take part in a strike. Second, it can
(e.g. by compulsory arbitration) weaken the union’s possibilities to respond
to the employers’ offers. In the traditional collective bargaining models,
the relative bargaining power of the labour unions is taken as fixed. The
microfoundations of this approach2 are that when two players are making
alternating offers to each other, they behave so as to maximize a weighed
geometric average of their utilities – the Generalized Nash product. The
weights of such an average, which reflect the relative bargaining power of
the parties, are determined by the parameters of the model. Labour mar-
ket regulation influences union power through these parameters. Following
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we assume that the government can make
1Cf. Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Dixit, Gross-
man and Helpman (1997).
2Cf. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
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smooth and continuous changes in union power. The results can then be
generalized for discrete changes in union power.
Brander and Spencer (1987) present unemployment as the main reason
why an economy promotes job-creating FDI, but they do not construct any
real theory of unemployment. In the studies that examine the strategic inter-
action between MNCs and local governments, no foreign investment typically
occurs unless taxation is restricted so that MNCs can end up with a positive
profit. Bond and Samuelson (1989) assume that an MNC has certain bar-
gaining power which it can use against the government. In Doyle and Van
Wijnbergen (1984), and Bond and Samuelson (1986), the government can
commit itself to tax holidays in the initial periods, so that foreign investors
have an opportunity to recoup their sunk costs before the government im-
poses new taxes. In Choi and Esfahani (1998), the government’s ability to
tax FDI is limited by an MNCs ability to withhold an important production
asset, which causes the specific capital of the host economy to become idle.
Our study differs from these papers in the following respects:
• In the papers referred to above, the government is entirely benevolent
(i.e., it has no interests of its own), but we assume that the ruling elite
is self-interested, and receives contributions from interest groups (e.g.,
MNCs and labour unions) in return for modifications in public policy.
• We demonstrate that the political process prevents the expropriation
of profits, even without institutional restrictions on taxation.
The following papers examine the relationship between labour unions and
MNCs with inward FDI. Naylor and Santoni (1999) suggest that because
high wages reduce potential rents associated with investment, a decrease in
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relative union bargaining power in a potential host economy subsequently
increases the likelihood of FDI within that economy. Zhao (1998) shows
that because FDI increases MNCs’ mobility between economies, it improves
MNC’s position in collective bargaining and depresses union wages in every
economy. These papers assume that relative union bargaining power is ex-
ogenously given, and that there is bargaining over wages only. We assume
that relative union bargaining power is endogenous in the political equilib-
rium. Following Manning (1987a; 1987b), we also assume a MNC and a
labour union can bargain over both wages and employment.
Haaparanta (1996) examines inward FDI in a common agency framework.
Because he focuses on a case in which a number of benevolent governments
try to attract an MNC to make FDI, he assumes the governments to be prin-
cipals, and the MNC he designates as the agent. In this paper, we consider
the case where an MNC’s willingness to invest in a country depends on both
labour market institutions and the response of a self-interested government.
Hence, we assume that the MNC and the union representing its workers are
principals, while the government is the agent.
Palokangas (2003a) examines the political economy of collective bargain-
ing in the following framework. The economy is closed and output is pro-
duced from labour only. First, there is a bargain over wages, then a bargain
over employment between the producer and the labour union. Depending
on government regulations, union power may be different within these two
bargains. Workers and producers lobby the government. The main result
is that if it is much easier to tax wages than profits, then the government
protects union power by labour market regulation. In this document, we
extend Palokangas’ (2003a) model for an open economy with FDI.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure
of the model as an extensive game. Section 3 defines technology and collective
bargaining. The government’s behaviour is endogenized in section 4. The
political equilibrium is constructed in sections 5 and 6.
2 Institutions as an extensive game
The economy is open. A MNC produces its output from labour, capital and
accumulates capital through FDI. After FDI has occurred, capital goods can-
not be sold.3 Hence, capital cost is sunk for the MNC. The MNC and the
labour union bargain first over wages and then over employment. The gov-
ernment sets taxes, provides public services and regulates the labour market.
Any public policy measures that strengthen (weaken) the position of unions
in collective bargaining are called labour market regulation (deregulation).
Unions and MNCs lobby the government, and offer contributions that are
conditional on prospective public policy.
The MNC sees the economy only as an export base and is therefore not
interested in the local market it offers. There exists a competitive sector
which produces b units of traded goods from one labour unit. Because workers
are free to move to that sector, their opportunity wage is equal to b. Given
these assumptions, we can focus on an economy in which there is only one
MNC and one worker. These two agents bargain over labour conditions and
lobby the government. The government is free to set any income tax rate
t ∈ (−∞, 1) for the worker, and is free to place any ad valorem tax rate
3Grout (1984) and Palokangas (2000), Chapter 5, assume that capital can be sold
abroad as old investment goods after machines have been installed. Because this extension
would excessively complicate the model, we prefer to assume that capital is wholly country-
specific.
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τ ∈ (−∞, 1) on the MNC’s investment. Because the MNC can use transfer
pricing to avoid profit taxes, we assume, for simplicity, that there is no direct
tax on the MNC’s profit.4
We present the institutional characteristics of the economy as an extended
game with the following sequence of events.5 First, the worker and the MNC
lobby the government (or the political elite) by announcing contributions.
Second, the government sets taxes, regulates relative union power in the bar-
gains over the wage and employment, and collects the contributions. Third,
the MNC decides on its investment. Fourth, the worker and the MNC bargain
over the wage. Fifth, the worker and the MNC bargain over employment.
Sixth, the MNC determines its output. This extensive game is now solved
through backward induction.
3 Production and collective bargaining
The MNC produces its output y from capital k and labour l through the
thrice differentiable and strictly concave production function
y(l, k), yl > 0, yk > 0, yll < 0, ykk < 0, y(0, k) = y(l, 0) = 0,
where subscripts l and k denote the partial derivatives with respect to l and k.
The MNC’s unit capital cost c is given from abroad. Because the government
determines which workers cannot take part in a strike, the number l0 of non-
4It would be only a minor modification of the model to extend it, in line with Palokangas
(2003a), to the case where the MNC pays profit taxes but conceals its profits from the
government at some cost. The profit tax would then be set according to the Ramsey rule
(see proposition 5). Otherwise, the results would be the same as in this paper.
5In a larger version of this paper [Palokangas (2003b)], the author examines also the
case where labour contracts are credible, i.e. where wage and employment bargaining
takes place before investment. The results are more or less the same as in this paper,
except that the credibility of labour contracts increase the MNC’s expected profit.
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striking workers is the government’s policy instrument. We define
l0 =
{
θ in the bargain over the wage,
ξ in the bargain over employment.
(1)





= y(l, k)− wl − (1 + τ)ck without a strike,
Π(l0, k, τ)
.
= y(l0, k)− bl0 − (1 + τ)ck with a strike,
−ck without production,
(2)
where b is the reservation wage. The expropriating tax τˆ = [y(l, k)−wl]/(ck)
then equalizes the profits with and without production. The worker’s income
in the MNC’s service, V , is given by
v = V
.
= (1− t)wl − bl = [(1− t)w − b]l, (3)
where wl is total wages, t the labour tax and b the competitive wage.
We assume that the worker and the MNC can change their wage and
employment policy after the MNC has made its investment k.6 Since the
worker (or union) can prevent production from taking place, then, noting
(2), the MNC’s status quo income is given by Π. Since without production
the worker earns nothing, his/her status quo income is zero.
The MNC chooses first its investment k, before the bargains take place
over the wage w and employment l. The worker attempts to maximize his/her
income V , while the MNC attempts to maximize its profit Π minus its status
quo income Π. There is asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wage w and
employment l. First, the product V α(Π − Π)1−α is maximized by the wage
w, where parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the measure of union relative bargaining
power. Finally, the product V β(Π − Π)1−β is maximized by employment l,
where parameter β ∈ [0, 1] is the measure of union relative bargaining power.
6The case where the worker and the MNC can change their wage and employment
policy after the MNC has made its investment is examined in the larger version of the
model [Palokangas (2003b)].
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The sequential subgame is solved backwards as follows. At the final stage,
given (1), (2) and (3), employment l is determined by
max
l
V β[Π− Π(ξ, k, τ)]1−β = max
l
{




β log l + (1− β) log[y(l, k)− wl − y(ξ, k) + bξ]}.
Given this, the wage w is equal to the weighted sum of the average product
[y(l, k) − y(ξ, k) + bξ]/l and the marginal product yl(l, k) of labour, where
the weights are the worker’s and the employer’s relative bargaining power:
w = β[y(l, k)− y(ξ, k) + bξ]/l + (1− β)yl(l, k). (4)
Inserting this into (2) and (3) yields the worker’s income and profit as follows:
v = V (l, k, t, τ, β, ξ) = (1− t){β[y(l, k)− y(ξ, k) + bξ] + (1− β)lyl(l, k)}− bl,
pi = Π(l, k, τ, β, ξ)
.
= y(l, k)− wl − (1 + τ)ck
= (1− β)[y(l, k)− lyl(l, k)]− (1 + τ)ck + β[y(ξ, k)− bξ],
∂V
∂l
= (1− t)[yl + (1− β)lyll]− b, ∂Π
∂l







At the second stage of bargaining, the wage w is chosen to maximize the
Nash product V α(Π−Π)1−α by l, given the response at the second stage (4).
Because there exists a one-to-one correspondence from w to l through (4),
then, given (2), (3) and (5), one can equivalently maximize the logarithm




V α[Π− Π(θ, k, τ)]1−α]
= α log V (l, k, t, τ, β, ξ) + (1− α) log[Π(l, k, τ, β, ξ)− Π(θ, k, τ)] (6)
by employment l. This yields the first-order and second-order conditions:
∂Λ
∂l































(θ, k, τ) > 0. (8)
At the first stage of bargaining, the MNC maximizes its profit pi =
Π(l, k, τ, β, ξ) by investment k and employment l, given the equation (7).
Given (3), (5) and (8), this maximization yields




∣∣ ∂Λ/∂l = 0}, pi∣∣
β=1, ξ=0
= −(1 + τ)ck < 0,

















The government produces a quantity g of public services from traded goods,
and finances this by tax revenue twl+τck, where t is the tax on wage income
wl and τ is the tax on investment expenditure ck. Given this, (4) and (9),
we obtain the tax revenue function
g(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
.
= twl + τck. (10)
We assume that the economy is on the increasing part of the Laffer curve:
∂g/∂τ > 0, ∂g/∂t > 0. (11)
We denote the worker’s and the MNC’s contributions by Rw and Rf
respectively. Subtracting Rf from the MNC’s profit pi yields the MNC’s
consumption Cf . Subtracting Rw from the worker’s total income v yields
8
the worker’s consumption Cw. We specify differentiable functions
Cw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rw)
.
= v(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)−Rw, ∂Cw/∂Rw = −1,
Cf (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rf )
.
= pi(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)−Rf , ∂Cf/∂Rf = −1. (12)
The worker’s utility function is then given by
Uw(Cw) + U g(g), (Uw)′ > 0, (Uw)′′ < 0, (U g)′ > 0, (U g)′′ < 0. (13)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), and noting (10)-(13), we obtain
the government’s objective function as:
G(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rw, Rf ) = Rw +Rf + Uw(Cw) + U g(g). (14)
The government receives contributions from the worker and the MNC only
if the MNC’s and the worker’s consumption, Cf and Cw, are non-negative.
Otherwise, the MNC does not invest k = y = 0 or the worker refuses to
work for the MNC, l = y = 0. Given this, the government chooses its policy





(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
∣∣ Cf(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rc(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)) ≥ 0,
Cw
(
τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
) ≥ 0}. (15)
Now, we will explore the effects of lobbying by the MNC and the worker
on taxation and labour market regulation (i.e., on variables τ , t, α, β, θ and
ξ). The contribution schedule of the worker is given by Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ),
and that of the MNC by Rf (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ). The government maximizes
its welfare (14) by choosing (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ) ∈ Γ. Following proposition 1
of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium for this game is a set of contribution schedules Rw∗(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ) and
9
Rc∗(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ) and public policy (τ ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗, θ∗, ξ∗) such that the fol-
lowing conditions (i)− (iv) are satisfied:
(i) Contributions are non-negative but less than the contributor’s income.
(ii) The policy (τ ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗, θ∗, ξ∗) maximizes the government’s welfare (14)
taking the contribution schedules as given,






τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ), Rf (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
)}
; (16)
(iii) The worker (MNC) cannot have a feasible strategy Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)(
Rf (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
)
that yields him a higher level of utility than in equilib-
rium, given the government’s anticipated decision rule,7
(








(iv) The worker (MNC) provides the government at least with the level of
utility that it could get when the worker (MNC) offers nothing
Rw = 0 (Rf = 0), and the government responds optimally given the MNC’s
(worker’s) contribution function,
G(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ), Rf (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ))
≥ sup
(τ˜ ,t˜,α˜,β˜,θ˜,ξ˜)∈Γ
G(τ˜ , t˜, α˜, β˜, θ˜, ξ˜, Rw(τ˜ , t˜, α˜, β˜, θ˜, ξ˜), 0)),
G(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ), Rf (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ))
≥ sup
(τ˜ ,t˜,α˜,β˜,θ˜,ξ˜)∈Γ
G(τ˜ , t˜, α˜, β˜, θ˜, ξ˜, 0, Rf (τ˜ , t˜, α˜, β˜, θ˜, ξ˜)). (18)
7Here, the utility of the worker (MNC) is independent of his/her contribution schedule.
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5 The political equilibrium
Given differentiable functions (12) and (13), conditions (17) take the form
(






Cw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ))
)
,(

















for i = τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, (20)
which suggests that in equilibrium the change in the worker’s (MNC’s) con-
tribution due to a change in the instrument is equal to the change in the
worker’s (MNC’s) consumption due to this same fact. Thus, the contribu-
tion schedules are locally truthful. As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), or
in Grossman and Helpman (1994), this concept can be extended to a globally
truthful contribution schedule. This type of schedule represents the prefer-
ences of the worker (capitalist) at all policy points. From (12), (18) and (20)
it follows that the truthful contribution functions take the form
Rw = max[0, v − v0], Rf = max[0, pi − pi0], (21)
where v0 (pi0) is the worker’s (MNC’s) income when he does not pay con-
tributions but the government chooses its best response given the MNC’s
(worker’s) contribution schedule.
Given ∂pi/∂τ < 0 in (9), the government can press profit pi down to zero
by increasing τ . Hence, if the MNC does not pay contributions, Rf = 0, the
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government can choose pi = pi0 = 0. This implies R
f = max[0, pi − pi0] =
max[0, pi] = pi and Cf = pi −Rf = 0. We summarize:
Proposition 1 If the government is not able to commit to non-expropriating
investment tax τ , then it takes all surplus of FDI, Cf = 0.
For the remainder of the study, we assume that non-expropriating investment
taxation is eschewed e.g. by an international agreement. The problem is then
whether this is enough to support the profitability of FDI.
Assume next α = β = 0. Because then ∂pi/∂t < 0 by (9), the government
can press profit pi down to zero by increasing t. This implies Rf = max[0, pi−
pi0] = max[0, pi] = pi, C
f = 0 and the following result:
Proposition 2 If the labour market is competitive, α = β = 0, then the
government takes all surplus of FDI, Cf = 0.
This result is in distinct contrast with the conventional wisdom that MNCs
should prefer a fully deregulated (or non-unionized) labour market.
Now, assume that the government can freely choose relative union power
β ∈ [0, 1] and the number of non-striking workers, ξ, in the bargain over
employment. If the MNC does not pay contributions, Rf = 0, then, given
(9), the government sets β high enough and ξ low enough to press profit pi
down to zero, pi0 = 0. We summarize:
Proposition 3 If there is a bargain over employment, then the government
can use labour market regulation (i.e. β or ξ) as a non-distorting income
transfer by which it takes all surplus of FDI, Cf = 0.
Propositions 2 and 3 yield the following corollary:
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Proposition 4 Only with right-to-manage bargaining (i.e. with no bargain
over employment, β = 0) does FDI yield profit, Cf > 0.
6 Policy rules
Assume that relative union power in the bargain over employment, β, is kept
constant. Conditions (16) then take the form that the government’s objective
function (14) must be maximized by τ , t and α subject to set (15). Given
(13) and (19), this is equivalent to maximizing the function
L =Rw(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ) +Rf (τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ) + Uw(Cw∗ ) + U g
(








τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rc(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
)
, (22)
by τ , t and α, where, by the envelope theorem, Cw∗ and C
f
∗ can be taken to
be independent of τ , t and α, and the multipliers µ and ϑ satisfy conditions
µCw
(
τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rc(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
)
= 0, µ ≥ 0,
ϑCf
(
τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ, Rc(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
)
= 0, ϑ ≥ 0. (23)
The worker’s and MNC’s total revenue C
.
= Cw + Cf is equal to output y
minus capital cost ck minus the worker’s opportunity wages bl minus the
government’s tax revenue g. Given (9) and (10), we then obtain
C(τ, t, α, β, θ, ξ)
.
= Cw + Cf = y(l, k)− bl − ck − g. (24)
If Cw > 0 and Cf > 0, then β = 0 holds by proposition 4 and noting



























= 0 for i = τ, t. (25)
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These conditions yield the following rule:
Proposition 5 A rational government sets taxes to minimize the deadweight
loss of public finance. If both the MNC and the worker benefit from FDI,
Cf > 0 and Cw > 0, then the government sets taxes so that the decrease in
total consumption C due to a marginal increase in each tax is in the same











There are two sources of the deadweight loss of public finance: a lower profit
leads to lower investment and there is an opportunity wage b. These sources
make the tax revenue elastic with respect to the labour and investment taxes.






























= 0 for i = α, θ. (26)
In the model, the partial derivatives of C with respect to α and θ are un-
fortunately ambiguous. We make however the plausible assumption that
the increase in union power (i.e. a higher α or a smaller θ) reduce total
consumption, ∂C/∂α < 0 and ∂C/∂θ > 0, but increase the worker’s con-
sumption, ∂Cw/∂α > 0 and ∂Cw/∂θ < 0. This and the definition (24) imply
∂Cf/∂α < 0 and ∂Cf/∂θ > 0. If ∂g/∂α ≤ 0, then, given (23) and (26), the












> 0 for i = α, θ,
which implies Cw = 0. In the remaining case ∂g/∂α > 0, there is either
∂C/∂α+ (U g)′∂g/∂α = 0 or Cf = 0 . We summarize these results as:
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Proposition 6 If deregulation (i.e., a decrease in α) does not reduce tax
revenue g, ∂g/∂α ≤ 0, the government eliminates through it the worker’s
benefit from FDI, Cw = 0. Only if tax revenue is an increasing function of
union power, ∂g/∂α > 0, does there exist a political equilibrium in which the
government maintains union power by regulation to minimize the deadweight
loss of public finance. When both the MNC and the worker benefit from
FDI, Cf > 0 and Cw > 0, the government increases union power α through

















This proposition can be explained as follows. Because labour market
deregulation (the decrease in α) decreases union power and wages but in-
creases the MNC’s and worker’s total revenue C, it is in the government’s
best interest to implement deregulation as long as this does not decrease tax
revenue, ∂g/∂α ≤ 0. If regulation (i.e., the increase in α) increases tax rev-
enue g, then the government uses regulation in combination with taxes t and
τ as a means of evening out the deadweight loss of public finance. Then, in
equilibrium, the decrease in total revenue C must be in the same proportion
to the decrease in tax revenue g for a marginal increase of any of the three
policy instruments τ , t and α.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines the MNC’s investment risk. The main characteristics
of this model are the following. If the government protects union power,
then the MNC bargains over wages and employment with a labour union.
Self-interested governments set taxes to finance public services and regulate
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the labour market, and lobbies representing the workers and MNCs try to
influence government policy. There are sunk costs associated with FDI.
Conventional wisdom has said thus far that labour market deregulation
improves the competitiveness of the economy as regards attracting FDI. In
contrast, this document suggests that deregulation presents a potential risk
for FDI. When wages are competitively determined, the government can use
labour and investment taxes as a combined non-distorting instrument, by
which it can expropriate all surplus of FDI. When there is bargaining over
both wages and employment, governments can use taxation and labour mar-
ket regulation together as a non-distorting instrument for the same purpose.
Hence, only right-to-manage bargaining truly ensures profits for FDI.
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